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During the past generation the problem of state legislative
apportionment or "malapportionment" has become increasingly
important due to population shifts. As America develops into a
predominantly urban nation' the apportionment schemes set up
ten to sixty years ago in the various states become more burden-
some. Today, majorities in the senates of thirty-three states repre-
sent fewer than forty per cent of the states' populations and the
situation is virtually the same in the lower houses. 2 The Colorado
Constitution requires, as do most state constitutions, that the legis-
lature reapportion its seats after every federal census. However,
this type of constitutional mandate is frequently ignored by state
legislatures. Thus, the problem arises that many legislators in our
state governments are elected on an apportionment scheme based
on the population-area ratio of their state as it existed around the
turn of the century.
The purpose of this paper is to examine decisions of the courts
regarding reapportionment and to note their underlying philosophy.
Looking briefly at the matter from an historical viewpoint, the
problem in the early 1900's was of a different nature from that
which confronts us today. State legislatures were then equitably
apportioned since their population centers had not changed radi-
cally from the time of the most recent apportionment legislation.
However, in the past fifty years our country has experienced a
great population shift. This shift has occurred not only from one
area of the country to another, but from one part of a state to
another. Apportionment laws of the various states have not been
amended so as to reflect these changes.
Earlier cases which challenged the validity of an apportion-
ment act were of two types. First, suits were brought against a
recently enacted apportionment law. Such suits have always suc-
ceeded when the new act was found discriminatory. 4 Secondly,
actions were frequently brought against individual election offi-
cials, seeking to restrain them from holding the next election
under the new apportionment act. These officials were usually
enjoined and directed to hold the election under an-older act which
had presumably not been repealed.5
The problem today is of a different nature. Many of our state
legislatures have failed to reapportion since the 1910 or 1920 federal
censuses. Thus, the voter is confronted with a type of silent gerry-
*Recent graduate, University of Denver College of Low.
1 106 Cong. Rec. 13827 (daily ed. June 29, 1960).
2 Id. at 13828. Indeed, seventy percent of our population now resides in cities or urban areas.
3 Colo. Const. art. 5, §45.
4 Stiglitz v. Shardien, 239 Ky. 799, 40 S.W. 2d 315 (1931); Ragland v. Anderson, 125, Ky. 141,
100 S.W. 865 (1907); Giddings v. Blacker, 93 Mich. 1, 52 N.W. 944 (1892).
5 Attorney General v. Suffolk County Apportionment Cornm'n, 224 Mass. 598, 113 N.E. 581 (1916);
Bo-rd of Supervisors v. Blacker, 92 Mich. 638. 52 N.W. 951 (1892); State ex rel. Attorney General v.
Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724 (1892). See also, People ex ref. Baird v. Board of Super-
visors, 138 N.Y. 95, 33 N.E. 827 (1893), wherein the court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the
Kings County Board of Supervisors to divide the county into legislative districts of equal population.
DICTA
DICTA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1961
mandering resulting from legislative inaction. This problem often
occurs because the present-day plaintiff does not seek to invalidate
a re-ently enacted apportionment law, but seeks to compel the
passage of a new act or have an old one invalidated. Historically
the plaintiff sought relief through the medium of a writ of man-
damus. A typical early example was the case of Fergus v. Marks,
6
wherein the plaintiff sought to compel the legislature to pass ap-
propriate legislation in accordance with a constitutional mandate
directing that "the general assembly shall reapportion" after every
federal census.7 The court refused to grant such relief, basing its
reasons on the separation of powers doctrine and stating that the
duty to reapportion was upon the legislature and the remedy for
its failure to perform lay with the people, not the courts. This gave
rise to a series of other cases in Illinois where by varying methods,
the same ends were sought.8 All met the same fate as the original
Fergus decision. These cases emphasized the court's philosophy of
refusing to allow a plaintiff to do by indirect means that which
was disallowed by direct methods. A novel question raised by one
of these Illinois cases9 was whether legislators elected under an
invalid apportionment act were qualified to continue in office.
The same question has arisen in other states and it is generally
conceded that the legislature is the sole judge of the election re-
turns and the qualifications of its members.10 Courts usually hold
that such legislators are dejure members and not merely de facto.
It should be noted that the courts are dealing with apportion-
ment acts which were valid when passed, but which became dis-
criminatory due to population shifts. Courts are not hesitant to
test the validity of a new apportionment act, but they are reluctant
when an old act is challenged as having become invalid as a result
of a population shift. This is true even though the constitutional
mandate to reapportion is violated.1
Some of the reasons advanced by the federal courts for deny-
ing relief have been: (1) such cases involve questions of a "pe-
culiarly political nature" which should be left to the legislature;
1
2
(2) a decision which compelled a legislature to reapportion would
violate the separation of powers doctrine;13 and (3) federal court
interference violates state sovereignty.
1 4
6 321 Ill, 510, 152 N.E. 557 (1926).
7 III. Const. art. 4, §6 (a provision common to many state constitutions).
8 Fergus v. Kinney, 333 III. 437, 164 N.E. 665 (1928) (action to enjoin the state treasurer from pay-
ing the salaries of legislators on grounds that failure to reapportion prevented the legislature from
being a legally constituted body); People ex rel. Fergus v. Blackwell, 342 III. 223, 173 N.E. 750 (1930)
(quo warranto seeking to oust legislators on ground that they had been elected under an unconstitu-
tional act); People v. Clardy, 334 III. 160, 165 N.E. 638 (1929) (a convicted criminal sought to have
statute under which he was convicted declared void on grounds that it was passed by a legislature
elected under an invalid apportionment act); Daly v. Madison, 378 Ill. 357 38 N.E.2d 160 (1941) (in-
junction sought against the expenditure of public funds to carry on election under invalid apportion-
ment act).
9 Fergus v. Kinney, supra note 8,
10 People v. Clardy, supra note 8; Fesler v. Brayton, 145 Ind. 71, 44 N.E. 37 (1896); In re Sherrill,
188 N.Y. 185, 81 N.E. 124 (1907); Jones v. Freeman, 193 Oka. 554, 146 P.2d 564 (1944); State ex rel
Sullivan v. Schnitger, 16 Wyo. 479, 95 Pac. 698 (1908).
11 Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959), prob. juris. noted, 81 Sup. Ct. 230 (1960);
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Butcher v. Rice, 397 Pa. 150, 153 A.2d 869 (1959).
12 Colegrove v. Green, supra note 11.
13 Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957). affirming 145 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956); Remmey
v. Smith, 102 F. Supp. 708 (E.D.Pa. 1951), off'd per curiam, 342 U.S. 916 (1952); Colegrove v. Green,
supra note 11; Perry v. Folsom, 144 F. Supp. 874 (N.D.Ala. 1956); accord, Smith v. Holm, 220 Minn.
486, 19 N.W.2d 914 (1945).
14 South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948); Colegrove v.
Green, supra note 11; but cf., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 81 Sup. Ct.
125 (1960), wherein the Court of Appeals felt bound by the Colegrove philosophy, but the Supreme
Court reversed. See generally, Greenfield, Ford and Emery, Legislative Apportionment: California in
National Perspective 24 (Bureau of Public Administration, University of California 1959).
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In addition to these objections, state courts have introduced
a variety of ideas: (1) invalidating one apportionment act and then
falling back upon an earlier act; 15 (2) requiring an election-at-large
until the legislature draws up valid districts;' 6 (3) invoking the
doctrine of laches, in that the act should have been attacked when
passed and it is now too late;"7 and (4) refusing to recognize that
the passage of time could invalidate a previously valid act.' 8
I. COURT DECISIONS
A. The United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court's reaction to the apportionment problem
has been somewhat typical of all courts. An early decision, Smiley
v. Holm,'9 involved a suit by a Minnesota citizen challenging an
act of the Minnesota Legislature2 0 which apportioned the state into
nine congressional districts. The house directed that the bill be
lodged with the Secretary of State, notwithstanding the governor's
veto. The Minnesota district court dismissed the case, the state
supreme court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding
the act void. The Supreme Court took jurisdiction in spite of the
political nature of the case with the view that to allow the election
to proceed under the act without the governor's signature would
not only enforce an invalid law, but would deny the plaintiff his
federal constitutional rights.2 The Court held the act invalid and
ordered election-at-large of the state's congressmen. The companion
cases of Koenig v. Flynn 22 and Carroll v. Becker2 3 involved identi-
cal questions (although arising in different states) which were
decided at the same time and under the same authority as the
Smiley case.
15 See, e.g., Ragland v. Anderson, 125 Ky. 141, 100 S.W. 865 (1907); Giddings v. Blacker, supra
note 4. See also Lewis, Legislative Apportionntent and the Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1057,
1068 (1958).
16 Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932). This is not an entirely inappropriate re-
lief since it at least allows every voter to have an equally powerful vote. The Supreme Court has
also approved this type of relief. See, e.g., Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932). But see Lamson v.
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 168 N.E.2d 480 (Mass. 1960), wherein the Massachusetts court dis-
approved of the election-at-large as a method of forcing the legislature to act.
11 Adams v. Bosworth, 126 Ky. 61, 102 S.W. 861 (1907).
1 Daly v. County of Madison, supro note 8; Smith v. Holm, supra note 13.
19 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
20 Minn. Laws 1931, p. 640.
21 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 4 provides: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Sena-
tors and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state, by the Legislature thereof ..---... It
was held that since the state constitution provided for the governor's signature or an overriding vote
an act of the legislature was not complete without one or the other.
22 285 U.S. 375 (1932).
23 285 U.S. 380 (1932).
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Colegrove v. Green,24 the leading reapportionment case, in-
volved an inequitable congressional districting law passed in 1901,
wherein the plaintiffs, voters of Cook County, sought to restrain
officers of the state from conducting, an election pursuant to the
act. The federal district court - 5 stated that the denial of a citizen's
right to choose a representative on terms of equality is prohibited
by the federal constitution, but held that it was bound by the
decision of Wood v. Broom, 26 which determined that a 1911 Missis-
sippi apportionment act was valid. A majority affirmed the case
on other grounds, although the Court was badly split. Mr. Justice
Fankfurter, with Justices Reed and Burton concurring, felt that
the Court should withhold jurisdiction since the Constitution con-
ferred upon Congress the exclusive authority to secure fair repre-
sentation by the states in the House. 27 Perhaps the real reason for
Justice Frankfurter's holding is that portrayed by his statement
that "the Court ought not to enter this political thicket."2 S Justice
Rutledge concurred specially on the ground that jurisdiction to
grant relief arose under Smiley v. Holm, 29 but that the case was
of such a delicate political nature that the Court shouJd avoid it.
Mr. Justice Black, with whom Justices Douglas and Murphy joined
dissenting, reasoned that the complaint stated a justiciable case
and controversy and that the Court had jurisdiction to act under
the rule that the federal courts will not hesitate to grant relief,
where there has been a federally protected right invaded. The dis-
senters stated that: "The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids such discrimination. It does not permit the
S ates to pick out certain qualified citizens or groups of citizens
to deny them the right to vote at all. 3 0 In conclusion, Mr. Justice
Black distinguished Wood on the ground that it merely decided
that the Mississippi Reapportionment Act did not violate the Con-
gressional Reapportionment Act of 1929. Therefore, the case did
not preclude the granting of equitable relief here since the question
in Colegrove had never been decided (whether the Court should
take jurisdiction and grant relief in such a political issue). A
majority in the Colegrove case felt that the Court had jurisdiction,
but Mr. Justice Rutledge, siding with the majority, decided that
the Court should not act due to the political nature of the prob-
lem. It is important that this factor be kept in mind since all the
later apportionment cases cite Colegrove as authority.
The next case, involving an analogous political problem, was
MacDougall v. Green.31 There the plaintiff, the Progressive Party,
attacked the validity of an Illinois statute requiring a certain num-
ber of signatures from each county to form a new political party.
24 Supra note 11.
25 64 F. Supp. 632 (N.D.111. 1946).
26287 U.S. 1 (1932). The case held that the Reapportionment Act of August 8, 1911, cs amended
by the Reapportionment Act of June 18, 1929, did not require that congressional election distr:cts be
"... contiguous and compact territory and as nearly as possible equal population .... " Therefore,
the Mississippi reapportionment act in quest:on was valid. This being the case, the Court said that
it would not consider relief in equity nor the justiciability of the questions in controversy. Four Fusticcs
felt that it was not necessary to decide the validity of the 1911 Reapportionment Act since the ccse
could be dismissed for mere want of equity. Thus, the political aspects of the case were never con-
sidered.
27 U.S. Const. art. 1, §2.
2 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1945).
29 295 U.S. 355 (1932).
30 328 U.S. 549, 569 (1945). As authority for this statement Justice Black cited Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) and N'xon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
31 355 U.S. 281 (1948).
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The plaintiffs charged that the statute discriminated against the
most populous counties and challenged its validity under the
fourteenth amendment as well as sections 1 and 2 of the seventeenth
amendment. 32 The Court decided that since suit was brought on
the eve of the Illinois election, relief should not be granted so as
to disrupt the State's political system. Justices Black, Douglas and
Murphy dissented on much the same grounds as they did in Cole-
grove, stating that here some citizens would have much more vot-
ing power than other citizens; therefore, the act was violative of
the fourteenth amendment.
In South v. Peters,33 plaintiffs challenged the Georgia county
unit system for determining the outcome of primary elections as
unconstitutional under the fourteenth and seventeenth amend-
ments. The Court refused to exercise its equity powers on the
ground that the problem was of a political nature and that states
retained the power to distribute their electoral strength as they
chose. Although the case can be distinguished on the basis that
a state has always been able to choose the manner in which it
distributes its electoral strength, the Court admittedly followed its
prior conservative pattern.
Kidd v. McCanless,34 involved an outmoded 1901 apportionment
act. The plaintiff sought to have the act declared invalid on the
ground that it had become unconstitutional under the fourteenth
amendment and in the alternative requested the issuance of a writ
of mandamus to compel an election-at-large. The state supreme
court held that the de facto doctrine did not apply to members of
the general assembly in office. Consequently there could be no
existing legislature if the present act were struck down since there
was no prior act upon which to rely. The alternative relief was
also refused because the state constitution did not provide for an
election-at-large. The United States Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal, evidencing the Colegrove attitude not to enter such "politi-
cal thickets."
There is some evidence, however, that the Supreme Court may
be preparing to do an about face. The Court recently held that an
Alabama statute reducing the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee
was in violation of the fifteenth amendment.35 The statute in ques-
tion redefined the city's boundaries so as to exclude all Negroes
in the district from voting. The lower court held that although
the statute might be violative of the fourteenth or fifteenth amend-
ments, the motives of the legislature could not be questioned since
they had the exclusive power to redefine municipalities' boun-
daries. 36 Due to the political nature of the matter the court refused
to grant relief. The Supreme Court reversed, basing its holdings
on the fifteenth amendment's guarantee of the right to vote, regard-
less of color. Mr. Justice Douglas concurred on the grounds of his
dissent in Colegrove. Mr. Justice Whittaker concurred on the
32 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1, which provides that "'... No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the orivileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person . . . the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XVII is concerned with the quali-
fications of Senators from each state and the executive authority to fill vacancies.
33 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
34 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40, appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 920 (1956).
35 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
36 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959).
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ground that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment controlled, and that the fifteenth was applicable only when
one or a part of a group's voting rights had been abridged. Here,
petitioner enjoyed the same voting rights as all other voters in
the new district, but the voting rights of all of the voters had
been abridged.
In a Tennessee case,37 indistinguishable from Colegrove on the
facts, a three-judge federal district court found that due to popula-
tion shifts the Tennessee apportionment act, in force since 1901,
violated both state and federal constitutions. 38 However, the rea-
soning of Colegrove was followed. The court reiterated that the
remedy did not lie in the courts. Perhaps the fact that the Supreme
Court noted probable jurisdiction of Baker indicates that Cole-
grove will be reconsidered.
B. The Lower Federal Courts
The history of apportionment cases in the lower federal courts
has been analogous to the Supreme Court decisions, although there
is now evidence that the Colegrove doctrine is weakening in some
jurisdictions. Three cases arose during the early and middle fifties39
in which the plaintiffs sought to have old existing apportionment
acts declared invalid and an injunction or mandamus issued to
compel the legislatures to pass new apportionment acts in accord-
ance with ignored constitutional mandates. In each of these cases
relief was specifically denied on "political nature" grounds. During
this same period another case was decided by the federal district
court in Hawaii, departing from the traditional view.40 The action
was brought under the Federal Civil Rights Act 41 upon the claim
that a failure to reapportion, as. required by Organic Act of Ha-
waii,42 for a period of fifty-five years amounted to a denial of the
petitioner's rights as guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments. The court found a deprivation of equal protection and de-
clared the apportionment act invalid. This case has often been
distinguished by the fact that it involved only a federal-territorial
relationship. However, strong dictum indicated that the court would
have decided the same way regardless of the relationship in-
volved.
43
In 1958, a case decided by the Federal District Court of Minne-
sota seemed to indicate a break with the strict Colegrove doctrine.44
A three-judge court took jurisdiction of the controversy, cited the
school segregation cases, and noted that the old Minnesota Appor-
37 Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
38 Tenn. Const. art. 2, §§ 4-6 (1870).
39 Radford v. Gary, supra note 13; Remmey v. Smith, supro note 13; Perry v. Folsom, supra
note 13.
40 Dyer v. Kazuh'sa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220 (D.Hawaii 1956).
41 Rev. Stat. §1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1959).
42 31 Stat. 141 (1900), as amended, 48 U.S.C. §§ 491-723 (1959), as amended, 48 U.S.C. §§ 536-723(Supp. 1959).
43 "We believe there should be a broader ground for sustaining the action of this Court than the
special nature of territorial-federal relations. The Supreme Court has stricken any attempts to dis-
criminate in elections because of race, creed or color . . . . The time has come, and the Supreme
Court has marked the way, when serious consideration should be given to a reversal of the traditional
reluctance of judicial intervention in legislative reapportionment .... " 138 F. Supp. 220, 226. As
authority for this lost statement the court cited Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), a leading case concerning federal intervention in the area of segregation and discrimination.
44 MaGraw v. Donovan, 159 F. Supp. 901 (D.Minn. 1958), per curiam, 163 F. Supp. 184 (D.Minn.
1958). The Court determined it had jurisdiction, but refrained from acting in the second case to af.
ford the legislature a full opportunity to "heed the constitutional mandate to redistrict."
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tionment Act of 1913 violated the fourteenth amendment. Jurisdic-
tion was retained and decision deferred until the legislature could
have further opportunity to act. Apparently the case caused some
consternation in the legislature for a new apportionment act was
quickly passed and the pending suit dismissed upon motion by the
petitioner.
45
It is significant that these later federal cases involved actions
seeking to have the existing apportionment acts declared invalid
while the prior three cases sought to compel the legislatures to
pass new apportionment acts. It therefore becomes clear why the
courts absolutely refused relief in the earlier cases and granted
it in the latter two, where plaintiff's requested relief was within
the court's power to grant.
C. The State Courts
State apportionment cases have followed the federal pattern.
New apportionment acts which are discriminatory in nature have
almost always been struck down.46 Old acts are presumed valid,
and the courts will generally refuse to invalidate them.4  The
cases here discussed should be distinguished from those involving
actions against special apportionment agencies or boards. A court
will usually feel free to compel such agencies or boards to act since
there is no constitutional problem of separation of powers in-
volved. 48 These cases, in practically every instance, involve a new
act and hence are not precedent for overturning an old apportion-
ment act.
In Donovan v. Holzman,49 the Illinois Court upheld the validity
of a recent reapportionment act, but stated:
At the outset, we think it clear that this court has the
power to strike down an apportionment act which is viola-
tive of the clear requirements of the constitution .... The
mere fact that political rights and questions are involved
does not create immunity from judicial review. 0°
This language appears to fly in the face of Colegrove, although
it can be reconciled on the basis that a new apportionment act
was involved. In Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley,51 the New
Jersey Court took jurisdiction of an action in which the petitioner
sought to have the old apportionment act declared unconstitutional
45 MaGraw v. Donovon, 177 F. Supp. 803 (D.Minn. 1959).
46 Cases cited note 4 supra.
47 Butcher v. Rice, supra note 11; Smith v. Holm, supro note 13; Daly v. County of Madison,
supra note 8.
48 Preisler v. Doherty, 365 Mo. 460, 284 S.W.2d 427 (1955) (involidation of a redistricting order
made by a reapportionment agency); Pickens v. Board of Apportionment, 220 Ark. 145, 246 S.W.2d
556 (1952) (the court not only invalidated the board's action, but prescribed an entirely new reap-
portionment of the state's election districts as it -was constitutionally authorized to do); Smith v.
Board of Apportionment, 219 Ark. 611, 243 S.W.2d 755 (1951) (court ordered board to gre one
county an additional senator and drop one seat elsewhere); State ex re1. Herbert v. Bricker. 139
Ohio St. 499, 41 N.E. 2d 377 (1942) (board compelled by mandamus to reapportion); Show v.
Adkins, 202 Ark. 856, 153 S.W.2d 415 (1941) (court shifted seats in reapportionment). See People
ex rel. Baird v. Board of Supervisors, 138 N.Y. 95, 33 N.E. 827 (1893), one of the earliest cases
in which a court ordered a board to reapportion the legislative districts of the state.
49 8 III. 2d 87, 132 N.E.2d 501 (1956).
50 Id. at 93, 132 N.E.2d at 506. Accord, Board of Supervisors v. Pratt, 47 Ariz. 536, 57 P.2d
1220 (1936).
51 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705 (1960).
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under the state and federal constitutions and to restrain the holding
of any primary or general election until a new statute was passed.
The court retained jurisdiction but gave the legislature one more
chance to act. However, its language was meaningful:
The judicial branch of the government has imposed upon
it the obligation of interpreting the Constitution and of
safeguarding the basic rights granted thereby to the peo-
ple .... But when legislative action exceeds the boundaries
of the authority delegated by the Constitution, and trans-
gresses a sacred right guaranteed to a citizen, final decision
as to the invalidity of such action must rest exclusively
with the court. . . . However delicate that duty may be,
we are not at liberty to surrender, or to ignore, or to waive
it. 52
The court also suggested that Colegrove was no roadblock to their
decision since that case did not involve the mandatory require-
ments of a state constitution. It would seem, however, that such
a distinction merely begs the question whether courts should enter
this "political arena" at all, regardless of which constitution is
involved.
II. POSSIBLE MEASURES OF JUDICIAL RELIEF
The heart of the problem centers around the possibilities of
relief that our judicial system can logically and reasonably give.
Whether redress will be granted in any particular case, depends
upon the type of relief being sought.53 However, providing that
the objections which were outlined in the first part of this paper
are overcome, the courts could grant the following types of relief:
(1) Mandamus the legislature. This will undoubtedly never be
done, since to do so would quite clearly infringe upon the delegated
powers of the legislature and violate the departmental scheme of
government. 54 (2) Judicially declare that an outdated act is un-
constitutional and rely upon the legislature to reapportion. The
danger here is that the legislature might fail to act or might pass
an equally disproportionate act. In other words, such relief provides
no complete remedy.55 (3) A court could declare an act invalid
and decree that until a new reapportionment act is passed, all elec-
tions be held on an "at-large" basis.56 This method can certainly
not be said to discriminate against certain groups; however, two
apparent criticisms of this relief are that by an indirect mandatory
52 Id. at 7, 161 A.2d at 710.
53 This fact is often overlooked by critics of the decisions which have denied relief. One
plaintiff categorized all of the apportionment cases in his brief in an attempt to show why most
of them were not precedent for the court to rely on, nhould they choose to deny him the particular
relief he sought, viz, have the present apportionment act declared unconstitutional and enjoin the
secretary of state from conducting an election pursuant to it. Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 36, 37, McGraw
v. Donovan, 163 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn. 1958). Of course, the first question which a court must
decide is whether or not it wishes to enter such a " olt'cal arena."
54 State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 43 , 146 S.W. 40 (1912); People ex rrl. Wood',att
v. Thompson, 155 Il1. 451, 40 N.E. 307 (1895). See Comment, 17 La. L. Rev. 593, 616 (1957).
55 See, e.g., Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40 (1956), appeal dismissed, 352
U.S. 920 (1956).
56 Hume v. Mahan, I F. Supp. 142 (E.D.Ky. 1932), dismissed as moot, 287 U.S. 575 (1932) (dis-
missed because the case did not reach the Court until after the election-at-large had been h-ld);
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932); Brown v. Scundcrs,
159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932). This method of relief (election-at-large) has been discred:ted by
a recent Massachusetts decision wherein the court stated that to order such " . . . could not be
o means of securing action at the session specified in the constitution." Lamson v. Secretary of the
Commonwealth, 168 N.E.2d 480 (Mass. 1960). In other words, such extraordinary relief does not
guarantee that the legislature will act - at least that was the Court's v:ew.
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injunction it forces the legislature to reapportion (assuming that
they would be dissatisfied with the status quo) and it might be
construed as a violation of the separation of powers. doctrine.
57
Nonetheless, this seems to be an effeztive remedy and one which
has already been approved by the Supreme Court.58 (4) A court
might enjoin the holding of an election under the old apportion-
ment statute and require the secretary of state to notify each elec-
tion district of the correct number of candidates which it could
elect. This remedy would be appropriate only in states where such
a task was delegated to the Secretary of State. It was used by a
recent New Jersey court.5 9 (5) A court could compel non-legisla-
tive redistricting agencies in states where such agencies existed.60
III. OTHER SOLUTIONS
Several state have attempted to reapportion by popular initia-
tive action of the people, as is allowed in their constitutions. This
method, however, is far from being the panacea which it might
appear to be at first glance. In some instances the initiative is of
no value whatsoever. For example, in Missouri and Washington
successful initiative measures were nullified by subsequent amend-
ments of the legislature.61 In Massachusetts the initiative was de-
clared inapplicable to apportionment problems.6 2 The Maryland
Constitution provides that there shall be submitted to the voters
every twenty years a proposal for a constitutional convention to
be called by the General Assembly if the voters approve. 63 In 1950
the voters overwhelmingly endorsed a convention, but the malap-
portioned assembly refused to call one for fear it might pass new
apportionment provisions. 64 The Colorado Constitution gives its
citizens the power of initiative action,6" and in 1932 this power was
57 See Comment, 17 La. L. Rev. 593, 616 (1957).
58 Smiley v. Holm, supra note 56.
59 Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, supra note 51.
60 Cases cited note 48 supro. See Tabor, The Gerrymandering of State and Federal Legislative
Districts, 16 Md. L. Rev. 277, 293 (1956).
61 See State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 130 S.W. 689 (1910); State ex rel.
O'Connell v. Meyers, 51 Wash. 2d 454, 319 P.2d 828 (1957) (Mandamus seeking to require use of
the initiative measure was denied). Legislators Mangle Distriding Plan, 46 Nat'l Munic. Rev. 245
(1957).62 In re Opinion of the Justices, 254 Mass. 617, 151 N.E. 680 (1926).
63 Md. Const. art. 14, 2.
64 Tabor, The Gerrymandering of State and Federal Legislative Districts, 16 Md. L. Rev. 292 (1956).
65 Colo. Const. art. 5, § 1.
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used to pass a new reapportionment act and repeal the old. Al-
though attempts by the legislature to repeal the initiated act
failed,66 it should be borne in mind what a tremendous task such
initiative action requires. Strong political and moneyed interests
are always against such changes and these factors make a difficult
job almost impossible. 7
Other states have adopted or proposed constitutional provisions
which would take apportionment responsibilities away from the
political branch. The methods used in taking this responsibility
from the legislature vary. Some states have adopted or proposed
that special boards be given the power to reapportion.6 8 Other states
give or plan to give the duty to the secretary of state.6 In our two
newest states the duty of reapportionment lies with the governor.
70
The advantage of giving a "non-political" group the power to re-
apportion lies in the fact that a commission or board, whose sole
responsibility and purpose for being is to periodically reapportion,
can be compelled to perform by a writ of mandamus.7' The same
can be said as to a secretary of state or a governor. On the other
hand, it is a fundamental concept that a court cannot compel the
legislature to pass legislation (although some have tried72), even
though there is a constitutional mandate commanding the legis-
lature to act.73 The states which have reapportionment provisions
are fortunate. While the problem grows more acute in the remain-
ing states, the possibility of legislative relief grows more remote.
Without federal intervention or relief from the courts it would
seem that the voters are remediless. It is too much to ask of most
legislators that they vote for a reapportionment scheme which
might cost them their job.
IV. A SPECIFIC PLAN
The methods for reapportionment proposed by Alaska and Ha-
waii were recently considered by the United States Senate. Senator
Joe Clark of Pennsylvania proposed that a Constitutional amend-
ment be adopted providing that each state must reapportion its
legislature after every decennial census.74 He also proposed a senate
bill outlining methods for implementing this amendment. Roughly,
the provisions of the proposed bill were:
1. A state must reapportion if the legislative representation
in either house of one district exceeds by fifty (50) per
cent the legislative representation in that house by any
other one district.
2. If the legislature fails to act within two years after the
census or if any action within that time is declared in-
valid by the courts, it shall then become the duty of the
66 Armstrong v. Mitten, 95 Colo. 425, 37 P.2d 757 (1934).
67 For a discussion of the present situation in Colorado see Roos, Colorado Legislators Agree
Reopportionment Due, The Denver Post, Nov. 18, 1960, p. 26, col. 1; Roos, Three Counties in Denver
Area Entitled to Double Representation, The Denver Post, Nov. 10, 1960, p. 29, col. 1.
68 Ark. Const. amend. 23; Cal. Const. art. 4, § 6; Ill. Const. art. 4, § 8; Mich. Const. art. 5, § 4;
Mo. Const. art. 3, §1 7, 8 (for the senate); Ohio Const. art. 11, § 11; S.D. Const. art. 3, 1 5; Tex. Const.
art. 3, § 28. See generally, Lewis supra note 14, at 1089.
69 Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1; Mo. Const. art. 3, §§ 2, 3 (for the lower house); Ore. Const. art.
4, § 6 (should the legislature fail to reapportion on schedule).
70 Alaska Const. art. 6, § 3, 8, 10; Hawaii Const. art. 3, § 4.
71 Cases cited note 48 supro.
72 Fergus v. Marks, 321 Ill. 510, 152 N.E. 557 (1926).
73 Cases cited notes 39, 54 supra.
74 106 Cong. Rec. 13827 (daily ed. June 29, 1960).
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governor of that state to establish a board of citizens
whose duty it shall be to submit a plan for reapportion-
ment to the governor within ninety (90) days which
shall comply with the requirements.
3. Within one hundred-twenty (120) days following the es-
tablishment of such board the governor shall prescribe
by executive order such changes in territorial limits of
the election districts of the state and such changes in the
legislative representation in the state legislature as he
shall determine is required to bring the legislative repre-
sentation of the state into the requirements.
4. If the above action has not been taken within three years
after the date in which the legislature should have acted,-
it becomes the right of any citizen of the state to bring
an action in the highest court of that state.
5. The court shall determine whether the present legisla-
tive apportionment act complies with the requirements
and if it does not, the governor may be compelled by
mandamus to provide the required apportionment.
6. The highest court in the state may also determine the
validity at any time of any legislative reapportionment
act or any promulgation by the governor, upon the ap-
propriate suit being brought by a state citizen.
75
Instead of asking the state legislatures to ratify the proposed
constitutional amendment (which they would probably never do
since they now refuse to reapportion their own states), Senator
Clark proposed that the amendment be adopted in the states by a
constitutional convention held in each state solely for that purpose.
Delegates to the convention would be elected at large from through-
out the state, as was done to repeal the twenty-first (prohibition)
amendment. This would allow the city and urban areas to elect
their proportionate share of the delegates and thus protect their
interests. It would seem that if the courts continue to refuse relief
in these matters such an amendment could become a very real
possibility. Increased litigation shows that there is a growing reali-




Our judicial system has been hesitant to strike down apportion-
ment acts which were valid when enacted, but became invalid due
to population shifts. This philosophy has to a great extent evolved
from the Colegrove decision. Until the last twenty years few liti-
gants attempted to raise federal jurisdiction by asserting an act's
unconstitutionality under the fourteenth amendment. Perhaps the
reason for this is due to several factors. First, it has only been with-
in the last twenty to thirty years that our states have experienced
a noticeable population shift within their borders. Second, in the
last decade our Supreme Court has strongly asserted its power over
75 Id. at 13835.
76 For a discussion of the problem in nationwide perspective see series of articles, Merry, The
Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 2, 6, 9, 13, 16, 1958.
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matters which were formerly viewed as belonging to the states,"
viz, that the segregation cases broke through the "political thicket"
first is due to the fact that traditionally segregation is a better
known issue and lends itself to more public sympathy. The Ameri-
can press has always been quick to publicize segregation issues,
but not until recently has much attention been devoted towards
portraying the voter whose vote is diluted by an old opportion-
ment law.
The state legislative reapportionment problem becomes more
serious each year. Indeed, one writer has pointedly stated:
The effects of malaportionment are much graver today
than they were a century ago . . . the federal and state
governments spend a third of the national income . . .
[and] are relied upon to regulate every respect of a com-
plex industrial civilization . . . The rapid growth of our
population and change in its character make even more
urgent the need for regular, equitable adjustment of repre-
sentation.
7 8
Our courts could and should grant some remedy. No one can
deny that there is need for some type of relief when "the streams
of legislation . . . become poisoned at the source. '7 9 It has always
been the rule that when a federally protected right is invaded the
federal courts will provide a remedy.80 Further, the mere fact that
a problem concerns a political right should not shield it from ju-
dicial review.8' Federal jurisdiction can be based on Article 182 and
the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution.8 3 It is gen-
erally believed that the most appropriate relief which a federal
court could grant would be the striking down of the unconstitu-
tional state apportionment acts. In conjunction with this relief the
court could enjoin the holding of any election under the invalid act
or order an election-at-large of the state's legislature. Such forms
of relief are not beyond the power of a court to grant.8 4
It is suggested that while the above forms of relief may be
entirely proper they do not provide remedies complete in all aspects.
The challenged act is only eliminated, not replaced. Indeed, it can-
not be guaranteed that the state legislature will not pass another
act equally as offensive or fraught with injustice. Thus, while such
judicial relief may be entirely necessary or appropriate it does not
provide a fully satisfactory solution to the problem. The solution
lies only in a constitutional amendment such as that proposed by
Senator Clark. Only then could every voter be assured of preserving
a right which is constitutionally his.
77 Brown v. Board of Educat'on of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497(1954).
78 Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1095 (1958).
79 Chafee, Congressional Reapportionment, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 1015, 1016 (1929).
80 Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Neal v. Delaware,
103 U.S. 370 (1880).
81 Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Crunch 37) 137 (1803).
82 United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
83 Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Sup*. 824 (D. Tenn. 1959), prob. juris. noted, 81 Supp. Ct. 230 (1960);
MaGraw v. Donovan, 159 F. Supp. 901 (D. Minn. 1958), per curiam, 163 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn. 1958).
84 Cases cited note 83 supra; Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, supro
note 40.
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